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In his book Political Romanticism, Carl Schmitt makes the somewhat surprising claim that 
the Romantic tradition is complicit with the modern liberal order.1 By reducing reality to 
affect, Romanticism supposedly views the given ontological agon in terms of emotive 
dissonance that can only be overcome by a search for a higher aesthetic unity. If nothing has 
objective existence and everything is a matter of arbitrary affect, then Romantic self-
indulgence induces a flight from reality that is only possible within a liberal, bourgeois 
system, which views the private personal sphere as separate and opposed from the public 
political realm. But instead of leading to an apolitical withdrawal from the world, the 
Romantics are for Schmitt in secretly collusive harmony with the dominant ideology of 
liberalism precisely because they supposedly proffer a creed of individual anarchy that 
ironically involves a certain collective conformism to liberal values of negative freedom and 
absolute equality.2  
 
Just as Romanticism seems to legitimate liberalism by accepting its hegemony over the public 
sphere, so, too, liberalism requires Romanticism to provide a release for the anarchic desire of 
the private self. There thus appears to be a hidden convergence at work: since both traditions 
are indifferent to substantive truth, they deny the need for genuine political decision to resolve 
conflict, while their failure to embody a clear friend-enemy distinction renders them unable to 
constitute political community in the first place.3 For this reason, only the sWDWH¶VPRQRSRO\WR
decide on the state of exception can ± according to Schmitt ± choose an aesthetic structure, 
which connects popular experience to the transcendent nature of the polity and which thereby 
establishes legitimacy based not on positive law but on a defining myth of political unity ± as 
with Staat, Bewegung, Volk. 
 
However, Schmitt arguably misreads both Romanticism and liberalism. From Machiavelli via 
Hobbes, Locke and Grotius to J.S. Mill and John Rawls, the liberal (and republican) tradition 
pivots about the primacy of the individual over all forms of human association and allied to 
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this primacy is the replacing of notions of substantive goodness or truth with the ultimate 
foundation of society upon subjective rights secured by the power of the central state.4 Those 
rights are grounded in the human will and the artifice of the social contract that has 
supplanted older ideas of covenantal relationships governed by a logic of reciprocity or gift-
exchange. Liberalism is therefore inherently atomistic and oscillates between the isolated 
individual and some collective unity either objectively compounded or artificially supposed ± 
µ/HYLDWKDQ¶ZDVERWK By positing an asocial µstate of nature¶, liberal contractualism purports to 
invent the artificial order of politics. 
 
By contrast, Romanticism ± in the works of Novalis, Schlegel, Carlyle, Coleridge, de Biran and 
Bulgakov ± develops develop in novel ways the ancient and Christian idea that human beings 
as social, political creatures have a natural desire for objective, substantive values by which to 
orientate their lives and give them that coherent shape which alone engenders a sense of real 
fulfilment. 5  This teleological space cannot be equated with the impersonal, absolute 
sovereignty of national states and transnational markets but requires interpersonal relations 
within a mediated polity that has a transcendent outlook.  
 
So whereas liberalism merely regulates the evil and violence which it views as primary (and 
which therefore it perpetuates and even reinforces), Romanticism offers a vision of partial 
redemption in this life just because the Fall and original sin never fully destroyed the 
fundamentally peaceful, ontological ordering of the world. Rather, as fallen creatures equally 
capable of vice and virtue, human beings can discover their own particular purpose and place 
in society that is ordered WRWKHJRRGRIWKHZKROHFRVPRVXOWLPDWHO\URRWHGLQ*RG¶VFUHDWLYH
action. By practising virtue, we can be redeemed in this life up to a point and we can begin to 
redeem the promise of an original harmony. 
 
1. Political liberalism: original sin and foundational violence 
 
As the dominant modern political philosophy and ideology par excellence, liberalism grew 
out of two fundamental shifts. First of all, a liberal doctrine of universal rights under the aegis 
of a formal social contract replaced supposedly incompatible and even incommensurable 
notions of goodness. Secondly, the vision of an overarching unity of both imperium and 
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ecclesia gradually gave way to the idea of a violent anarchy within and between nations, 
which can only be controlled by the coercive powers of the sovereign state and the regulative 
powers of the transnational market. Underpinning these two transformations is the premise 
that evil is radical and more primary than the Good, for humankind is in a state of almost total 
depravity ± whether for religious reasons connected with the Fall and original sin or on 
secular grounds of imperfect, immanent nature. Here RQHPLJKWREMHFWWKDWWKHWHUPµOLEHUDO¶
suggests to many an optimistic vision that celebrates universal freedom, equality, and 
happiness. Liberalism is associated with the unalienable liberties and rights of the individual 
supposedly upheld by a constitutional state whose sovereignty derives from the people and 
whose powers are split between the three branches of government. The liberal tradition is also 
seen a decisive factor in bringing about popular democracy, enlightened progress, and 
emancipation from the constricting shackles of theology and faith in God. 
 
Yet to the contrary, at the core of a searching critique of liberalism lies the argument that it is 
a far too gloomy philosophy.6 For liberalism assumes that we are basically self-interested, 
fearful, greedy and egotistic creatures, unable to see beyond our own selfish needs and 
therefore prone to violent conflict. This is a profoundly pessimistic view whereby human 
virtue is not simply redefined, but ultimately dismissed and denied. It is just this view that 
ultimately informs the three founding fathers of liberalism in the seventeenth century: Hugo 
Grotius, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Instead of inherent virtue and reciprocal sympathy, 
one has in Hobbes and Locke WKHQRWLRQRIRULJLQDOO\ µVHOI-SRVVHVVHG¶ LQGLYLGXDOVPXWXDOO\
contracting to ward off the threat of the other and thereby to conserve and even promote by 
artificial means their supposedly natural self-possession. 
 
At first, *URWLXV¶SROLWLFDOWKHRORJ\VHHPVWREHIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURP that of Hobbes 
and Locke, as he rejects the nominalist and voluntarist conception of God and the cosmic-
political order, which can be traced to influential Franciscans such as William of Ockham 
who DUJXHG WKDW*RG¶VZLOODQGSRZHUFDQXQGR WKH ODZRIQDWXUHDQGVXEYHUW WKHGLYLQHO\
created cosmos.7 By contrast, Grotius defended an intellectualist vision according to which 
*RG¶V UHDVRQ DQG FUHDWLYH DFWLYLW\ EULQJ DERXW D UHODWLRQDO world composed of mutually 
related things, which is intelligible in terms of the unity of efficient and final cause in the 
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divine source of all being. 8QOLNH+REEHV¶DVRFLDOµVWDWHRIQDWXUH¶*URWLXV¶conception views 
human beings as naturally desiring life in society and governing the polity as God rules over 
the cosmos.8  
 
However, Grotius ± as an Arminian Calvinist ± developed a rationalist theology that has the 
effect of sundering the natural light of reason from the supernatural light of faith and also 
separating rationality from feeling, habit, and the imagination (a separation that thinkers of 
the Renaissance and Romanticism sought to overcome). Connected with Grotian rationalism 
is his emphasis on the formality of the law as the main mediation between individuals within 
domestic politics and among states in the realm of international relations. This follows 
directly from his theological argument that God reigns over humankind by legislative 
command rather than by the outflow of love and the example of virtue embodied in Christ.9 
While Grotius does define states as particular instantiations of a larger unity which he 
describes in terms of the universal society established by nature,10 he nevertheless views this 
unity in primarily formal, legal terms ± QRWD µWLFN¶ VXEVWDQWLYHconception of the common 
good that includes yet also transcends law. Shaped by the experience of the religious wars and 
by intra-confessional disputes internal to Dutch Calvinism, Grotius invokes natural rights as a 
means to restore an original community of humankind that was destroyed by original sin and 
continues to be ridden by the violence between and among confessional states. 
 
Crucially, for Grotius natural law provides the foundation for common norms that govern the 
polity, but he view man as the bearer of individual, subjective rights, which reinforces rather 
than mitigates the absolute power of the central sovereign (as for Hobbes and Locke).11 Even 
seemingly inalienable individual rights like the right to ownership or the power to delegate 
sovereignty to the ruler are ultimately alienable because property may be sold and delegation 
is irreversible. For inalienable individual rights are already defined in terms of subjective right 
(ius), independently of the right use (usus) and the objective purpose (finis). Although Grotius 
defends a strong notion of divinely ordained purpose such as peace and the unity of 
humankind, his political theology grants sovereign states such power over individuals and in 
                                                        
8
 Hugo Grotius, Meletius Or Letter on the Points of Agreement Between Christians, tr. Guillaume H.M. 
Posthumus Meyjes (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 106-112. 
9
 Ibid., p. 106; Hugo Grotius, Opera Theologica: De Satisfactione, tr. Hotze Mulder (Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 
1990), Vol. 1, p. 133; Hugo Grotius, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra, tr. Harm-Jan Van Dam, 




 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Vol. 1, p. 
300, and Vol. 2, p. 393. 
 5 
relation to other states that this effectively rules out an overarching commonwealth of nations 
and peoples precisely because there is no commonly agreed authority such as the imperium or 
the ecclesia.12 7KHUH ZDV VWLOO D VLJQLILFDQW VWHS IURP *URWLXV¶ IRUPDOLVW FRQFHSWLRQ RI DQ
international society of states to HobbHV¶ DQDUFKLFDO µVWDWH RI QDWXUH¶, but what binds them 
together is the rationalist primacy of formally sovereign individuals and states over a more 
mutualist cosmic-political order. 
 
$UJXDEO\ WKH WULXPSKRI OLEHUDOLVPPRUHDQGPRUHEULQJVDERXW WKHµZDURIDOODJDLQVWDOO¶
(Hobbes) and the idea of man as self-owning animal (Locke) that were its presuppositions. 
But this does not thereby prove those presuppositions, because it is only liberalism that has 
produced in practice the circumstances which it originally assumed in theory. In this manner, 
liberalism marks the entirely unnecessary and non-normative victory of vice over virtue ± of 
selfishness, greed, suspicion and coercion over common benefit, generosity, a measure of 
trust and persuasive power. 
 
A similar anthropological and ontological pessimism and the concomitant redefinition of 
virtue can be found in the republican tradition, which in this sense is not fundamentally 
different from the liberal one. Already with Machiavelli, vice is more fundamental than virtue 
because evil has greater ontological and political reality than goodness. Therefore the city, 
contrary to Greco-Roman philosophy and Christian Neo-Platonism, is not governed by a 
hierarchy of goods and ends but instead by a competition for survival and power. In 
0DFKLDYHOOL¶VThe Prince (chapter IX), it is the exercise of violence and the use of fear that 
regulate civic life, not the pursuit of peace or the practice of virtue. For Machiavelli virtù is 
the military and political excellence required to sustain collective independence, and can 
notably be fostered by a certain controlled sustaining of factional struggle within the city, 
which serves as a training ground for the combative spirit. Thus he shares with Hobbes the 
µOLEHUDO¶ DVVXPSWLRQ RI D JLYHQ RQWRORJLFDO agon, which is to be manipulated but not 
potentially overcome in the name of a more primary and peaceful ontological harmony (as for 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and the Judeo-Christian tradition). This agon is seemingly given a 
little more instrumental play by the Florentine than by the sage of Malmesbury. 
 
But just this dimension is an aspect of the later much-GHEDWHGµSROLWLFDOO\HFRQRPLF¶TXHVWLRQ
of the relation between military virtue on the one hand, and more muted commercial rivalry 
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on the other. It follows that the price of the modern secularisation of virtue in Machiavelli is 
also its re-primitivisation and re-paganisation, which returns virtue understood as virtù to its 
etymological root of male aggressive prowess ± not even the notion of excellence (as for 
Plato, Aristotle and Cicero) that was confined to the aristocracy and only democratised by the 
Christian fusion of Greco-Roman philosophy with biblical revelation. Arguably, this renders 
modern virtue actually proximate to liberal norms, whose formal negativity is predicated on 
the latent violence of an assumed initial lack of consensus (in the wake of the Fall) about 
anything save individual self-preservation and collective security. 
 
2. Political economy: depravity and the µhidden hand¶ 
 
Original sin is also at work in the other dominant tradition of modern political thought, 
traceable for example down to Adam Smith, which derives from Calvinist and Jansenist 
theologies of influential figures such as Pierre Nicole and Jean Domat.13 Nicole argued that 
the evil RI VLQ DQG PRUDO FRUUXSWLRQ FDQ EH XVHG WR VHUYH *RG¶V SURYLGHQWLDO SODQ ZKLOH
Domat claimed that God admits evil into the world because God could use evil as a remedy 
by deriving good from it. For this theological outlook original sin is so extreme that human 
EHLQJVPXVWEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHQHDUO\RUWRWDOO\µGHSUDYHG¶DQGLQFDSDEOHE\QDWXUHRIDFWLQJ
out of generous instincts to produce economic, social or political order. Instead, in a kind of 
proxy operation, divine providence must manipulate our egotistic wills and even our vices 
behind our backs. This occurs in such a way as to make will balance will and vice balance 
vice in order to produce a kind of economic and political harmony, as in Bernard 
0DQGHYLOOH¶V SDUDGR[LFDO PRWWR µSULYDWH YLFH SXEOLF EHQHILWV¶ ± even though this is never 
originally intended by self-obsessed individuals.14 Here is the conceptual URRW RI 6PLWK¶V
µKLGGHQKDQG¶15 
 
More important than even Nicole and Damat was Pierre le Pesant de Boisguilbert whose work 
is now seen as the key origin of both liberalism and modern economic thought.16 Building on 
'HVFDUWHV¶ GXDOLVP DQG WKH %DURTXH VHSDUDWLRQ RI *RG¶V JHQHUDO IURP +LV PRUH VSHFLDO
providence, Boisguilbert views the economy as an impersonal self-regulating machine. On the 
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one hand, in anticipation of Mandeville (and much layer Friedrich von Hayek), it must be left 
to run to its own devices, which means that the poor and the weak must sometimes be 
sacrificed. On the other hand, in anticipation of Smith (and much later John Maynard 
Keynes), the state must keep demand in balance with supply in order for the market to 
function naturally, and so high wages must be encouraged and the stockpiling of money by 
financiers should be especially resisted. 
 
In other words, Boisguilbert argues for a strong state just because market anarchy, which 
reflects the enduring power of original sin, can be so destructive. As a result he did not share 
the view that one requires the threat of poverty and the spur of hunger in order to force people 
to work in a world of lazy sinfulness and constitutive material scarcity, which we owe to the 
perverted theology of Thomas Malthus and which ± it must be said ± was entirely alien to the 
WKRXJKW RI %RLVJXLOEHUW RU ODWHU 6PLWK +D\HN RU .H\QHV +RZHYHU %RLVJXLOEHUW¶V 
conception of the interaction between state and market is still little more than a simulacrum of 
reciprocal charity, as John Milbank has argued.17 7KLV VLPXODFUXP LOOXVWUDWHV%RLVJXLOEHUW¶V
Jansenist and Calvinist pessimism: as with both Nicole and Domat, he argued that after the 
Fall an ensuing near total depravity ensures that God can only govern the world through the 
mutual regulation of greed by greed. Later, Mandeville and Malthus would pave the way for 
modern economic thought to develop the notion that an enlightened utilitarian self-interest 
ZLOOQDWXUDOO\DQGUDWLRQDOO\PD[LPL]HWKHµJUHDWHVWKDSSLQHVVRIWKHJUHDWHVWQXPEHU¶DQGVR
strengthen the operation of an impersonal machine that produces a divinely sanctioned order 
out of sinful human chaos. For the fundamental liberal assumption is that humans are selfish, 
greedy, distrustful of others, and prone to violence. 
 
By embracing this pessimistic vision, liberalism ends up abolishing its own early modern 
origins. The process had begun well back into the Middle Ages but was certainly 
consummated in the seventeenth century, arising to a large degree because agreement in the 
transcendent good started to be associated with conflict and warfare. Yet in the face of an 
increasing exigency for peace at any price, Hobbes and Locke oddly assumed a hyperbolic 
violence, a war of all against all as the natural human condition, as I already argued. They did 
so in part because they thought (and unsurprisingly, after the all too many wars of religion) 
that disagreements regarding the nature of the Good were not subject to rational arbitration.  
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But this exposes to view a remarkable chiasmus. Both the Greco-Roman philosophy of Plato, 
Aristotle or Cicero and Christianity believed that reality was originally and at heart peaceful, 
and only violent because of the irruption of fate or sin, and so in practice had often 
encouraged warfare. Liberalism exactly reversed this. In the name of reducing conflict, it 
thought that reality was inherently agonistic and humans naturally egotistic and indelibly 
prone to conflict. For this reason seventeenth-century liberalism totally rejected Renaissance 
humanism with its high view of the dignity of man. Here it often assumed the legacy ± as with 
Bernard Mandeville and Adam Smith ± of Calvinist and Jansenist doctrines of total depravity, 
as I have already indicated. In detailing the horrors committed in the name of liberalism ± 
slavery, imperialist exploitation, abuse of workers ± Domenico Losurdo tries to blame these 
RQ WKH DOLHQ LQIOXHQFH RI D µSURYLGHQWLDOLVW¶ SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ ZKLFK VDZ JRYHUQPHQWDO
intervention in the social and economic sphere as impious: both the earlier Burke and 
Tocqueville at every stage used such arguments.18 But this is not the distortion of liberalism 
by ancient theology. Instead, it is the influence of a new (largely Jansenist) theology that is 
part of the very constitutive fabric of liberalism itself.19  
 
3. µ7KHHPSLUHRIOHVVHUHYLO¶Oiberal pessimism and the metaphysics of progress 
 
A profound anthropological pessimism is thus at the heart of the liberal tradition and 
underpins the belief that liberalism, in the words of the French philosopher Jean-Claude 
Michéa, is the realm of lesser evil (O¶HPSLUH GX PRLQGUH PDO) ± the best of all possible 
realities in a world of necessary evil.20 Here we can see the constitutive paradox of liberalism: 
on the one hand, the liberal vision rejects ideology and utopian politics, as it conceives itself 
DV D µSROLWLFV RI OHVVHU HYLO¶ DQG DLPV Wo bring about the least evil society possible. This is 
grounded in the liberal claim that any invocation of positive principles such as truth or 
JRRGQHVVDPRXQWVWRDµW\UDQQ\RIWKH*RRG¶ZKLFKLVWDNHQWREHWKHXOWLPDWHVRXUFHRIDOO
evil. On the other hand, the liberal claim to liberate people from this tyranny by upholding 
µQHJDWLYH OLEHUW\¶ LQVWHDG RI LPSRVLQJ VXEVWDQWLYH YDOXHV HQGV XS PRUSKLQJ LQWR D QHZ
µW\UDQQLFDO¶RUGHU)RU WKHSXUVXLWRI OHVVHUHYLO UDWKHU WKDQ WKHFRPPRQJRRGSURJUHVVLYHO\
becomes as authoritarian as the tyranny that liberalism purports to oppose. Paradoxically, 
OLEHUDOLVP¶VDQWL-ideological and anti-utopian stance flips over into the first and final ideology 
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and utopia ± the universal reign of individual human rights, democratic politics, and market 
freedom. 
 
In this manner, OLEHUDOLVP¶VUHMHFWLRQRIDOOXWRSLDQLGHRORJLHVHQGVLQDXWRSLDQSURPRWLRQRI
an anti-XWRSLDQSURMHFWWKHOLEHUDOµSROLWLFVRIOHVVHUHYLO¶JLYHVULVHWRDJOREDOSROLWLFDORUGHU
that purports to be the best of all possible worlds ± WKHµHQGRIKLVWRU\¶DQGWKHFRQYHUJHQFH
towards liberal market democracy as the final form of human government. Taken together, 
the liberal priority of the individual, subjective rights and the social contract imply that 
liberalism privileges progress (towards negaWLYH OLEHUW\DQG µODZVRIKLVWRU\¶ HQWDLOLQJ WKH
QHFHVVDU\ µUDWLRQDOLW\¶ DQG WKHUHIRUH ORJLFDO QHFHVVLW\ RI WKLV SURJUHVV RYHU WUDGLWLRQ DQG
contingency. Thus, central to really existing liberalism is a pessimistic anthropology whereby 
over time liberal institutions bring about in practice the selfishness, greed, distrust and 
violence that liberal theory presupposes in theory, as I indicated earlier. There is a tendency of 
liberalism arbitrarily and contingently to bring into historical being the very condition that is 
its own ontological presupposition ± ZKHWKHU WKH +REEHVLDQ µZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO¶, or 
/RFNHDQ µSRVVHVVLYH LQGLYLGXDOLVP¶, or else again the Rousseauian loss of original freedom 
within the social contract.21 $QGHTXDOO\WRUHDOLVHDVDOLYHGF\QLFLVPWKHVHWKLQNHUV¶VKDUHG
pessimism about human nature (whether individually or in association with others). But to 
repeat, this realisation does not thereby prove that presupposition, because it is the ideas, 
institutions and practice of liberalism alone which have produced the circumstances that the 
liberal creed originally assumed and asserted to be universally true and unavoidable. 
 
Yet far from being necessary or normative, liberal ideas and practices were always radically 
FRQWLQJHQW EXW PRUSKHG LQWR µQDWXUDOO\ JLYHQ¶ FDWHJRULHV WKDW REVFXUH WKH UHDO RSSRVLWLRQ
between liberalism on the one hand, and conservatism and socialism on the other hand.22 The 
historic event, which set this process in motion, was the French Revolution. One of the first 
acts of the revolutionaries was to abolish all the intermediary institutions of civil society and 
recreate them under the absolute authority of the central state. The Loi Le Chapelier of 1791 
banned guilds and fraternities (or compagnonnage) defended by figures such as Montesquieu. 
The law was followed by a decree on 18 August 1792, which dissolved all types of 
congregations, both of the clergy and of the laity ± including universities, faculties and 
learned societies. Taken together, the law and the decree eliminated the right to strike and 
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instituted enterprise as the most fundamental mode of association or corporation. That is why 
the revolutionaries did not put an end to the power of privilege, whether in the form of 
patronal clubs or monopolistic arrangements that were ultimately in league with the central 
state. From the outset, the bureaucratic statism of the French Revolution was complicit with 
the cartel capitalism that underpins dirigisme at home and mercantilist trade abroad. That is 
why Colbertism represents one of the numerous continuities between the ancien régime and 
the various models of republican France from the seventeenth century to the present day. 
 
By thus subsuming all self-governing intermediary institutions under the aegis of the state, it 
removed all mediation between the controlling centre and the controlled individuals. The 
revolutionaries thereby abolished any political community outside the formal framework of 
the secular republic, which did not so much separate religious from political authority as 
replace free belief in God with the official creed of the Supreme Being (/¶ÇWUHVXSUrPH). As 
part of the revolutionary tabula rasa, substantive notions of solidarity and fraternity were 
abstracted from concrete roles and relationships as well as disembedded from traditions of 
thought and practice that forged them over centuries. 
 
Under the control of both state and market, fraternities and other intermediate institutions 
gradually moved away from mutual duties and reciprocal responsibilities towards a narrower 
focus on instrumental interest and the formal entitlements of their members. As a result, the 
revolutionary meaning of fraternity was compatible with the idea of a new citizen as the 
bearer of individual, subjective rights who is connected to other citizens via principally 
contractual ties. In this way, fraternity predominantly serves the primary principles of liberty 
and equality, defined as the negative freedom of each and the total sameness of all. Thus, all 
three values of the French Revolution are seen in terms of two types of sovereignty ± 
sovereign individuals and the sovereign centre ± which diminish and even destroy the 
autonomous self-determination of groups and associations, leaving the individual exposed to 
the impersonal forces of the state and the market. 
 
Over time, state and market have converged to form DµPDUNHW-VWDWH¶WKDWIXUWKHUVXERUGLQDWHV
the intermediary institutions to the combined power of capital commodification and 
bureaucratic collectivisation. 7KHULVHWRSRZHURIWKHµmarket-state¶RYHUDOWHUQDWLYHPRGHOV
reflects the hegemony of liberalism and the concomitant collapse of both non-capitalist 
conservatism and non-statist socialism. Indeed, from the 1990s onwards both the centre-left 
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and the centre-right have fused economic with social liberalism, notably financial and trade 
liberalisation coupled with a raft of equality legislation in pursuit of abstract ideals such as 
diversity and inclusivity. This convergence not only exposes the sham opposition between left 
and right, which was always more nominal than real, but it also reveals the hidden nature of 
both the liberal right and the liberal left. Right-wing liberalism is so cynical about individual 
motivation that it entrusts social order to the public mechanism of legally enforceable contract 
and to an inflexible protection of absolute and invariable property rights by the state. This 
occurs in the Nicole-like belief that the market will deliver a providential or natural 
simulacrum of the effect of real interpersonal charity and real distributive justice, in defiance 
of all the evidence that the simulation eventually delivers a degenerative distancing from 
ethical goals. The liberal left, on the other hand, so distrusts shared tradition and consensus that 
it endlessly seeks to release, by the agency of state power, chaotically various individual 
desires from any sort of generally shared requirements, which it always tends to view as 
arbitrary. Hence the convergence of the two liberalisms is reflected in the more apparent than 
real oscillation between the liberal right as the party of greed and the liberal left as the party of 
lust. 
 
Finally, we can also suggest that the triumph of liberalism over all other modern ideologies is 
to do with the way it has been doubly promoted by both hedonists and puritans ± both those 
unashamed of egoism as the basis of economic order and those who think the latter is a 
providential diversion and tempering of our shameful nature. Today the right, which has long 
since abandoned conservatism for liberalism, remains something of an uneasy alliance 
between these two different character traits, even if the puritans are fast losing ground. 
Meanwhile the contemporary left is almost entirely liberal and even libertarian. This is most 
RI DOO VKRZQ E\ WKH µ1HZ /HIW¶ which ever since the 1960s has rarely pursued a politics of 
solidarity but, rather, predominantly one of µHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶ Therefore left and right now have in 
common a preference for negative freedom and µODZVRIprogress¶ over shared ends and a sense 
of tradition and contingency ± all of which early Romanticism helps us to recover and renew. 
 
4. Romanticism and its critics 
 
The Romantic tradition has been misread and distorted by liberal and non-liberal critics alike. 
In his book The Roots of Romanticism, Isaiah Berlin wrongly claims that the Romantic 
movement rests on three doctrines that run counter to the Greco-Roman foundations of the 
West. The doctrine about primacy of expressionism, which is to redefine art as subjective 
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communication, not objective beauty. The doctrine about the priority of belonging to a 
specific group (such as the nation) over our common origins in a shared universal humanity. 
The doctrine about the incompatibility of one set of ideals, such as Romantic culture, with 
another set of ideals, such as the Greco-Roman universals of the true, the good and the 
beautiful. This leads Berlin to conclude that Romanticism is characterisHGE\³the denial of 
unity, the denial of harmony, the denial of the compatibility of ideals, whether in the sphere of 
action or in the sphere of thought´.23 In summary, Berlin equates the Romantic tradition with 
the triumph of irrational emotivism and moral relativism over the whole Western tradition of 
rational universalism since Socrates, which the Enlightenment rescued from the Dark Ages.24 
 
6FKPLWW¶V ERRN Political Romanticism represents the most comprehensive assault on 
Romantic ideas. He focuses on the supposedly incoherent nature of the Romantic tradition, its 
misguided metaphysical foundations, DQGLWVµDHVWKHWLFLVDWLRQ¶ RISROLWLFDOFRQIOLFW6FKPLWW¶V
FULWLTXH LQFOXGHV D PRUH JHQHUDO DWWDFN RQ (XURSH¶V ERXUJHRLV VRFLHW\ WKDW supposedly 
embraced Romanticism and thereby hollowed out the political order by turning public debate 
into a never-ending conversation about private pleasure, which undermines the collective 
capacity to decide. Nonetheless, Schmitt is right to acknowledge that Romanticism cannot be 
equated with three widely shared conceptions: either a set of properties that make different 
objects µromantic¶, or a psychological disposition (such as emotivism or a flight from reality), 
or else the antithesis of classicism and rationalism. All these views define Romanticism as a 
commitment to some naïve form of realism that assumes that certain objects are inherently 
romantic, independently of how they are conceived or experienced. Against this 
misconception, Schmitt contends that Romanticism represents a subjectivist account of reality 
because it is defined not realistically but rather transcendentally ± in terms of the romantic 
subject and its specific mode of existence. 
 
Like Berlin, Schmitt views Romanticism primarily as an aesthetic movement that overthrew 
the inherited, established order without developing an alternative account of beauty while also 
elevating art into the new transcendental absolute. In this process, the Romantics aestheticised 
not just every sphere of culture but also politics. This, coupled with the denial of shared 
objectivity, reinforced the privatisation of human experience and the subjectification of life. 
What underpins this thinking is a fundamental metaphysical rupture in the Western tradition ± 
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displacing divine transcendence as the organising principle of the cosmos and the polis. 
Curiously, Schmitt traces the roots of romantic thinking to a secularized version of 
0DOHEUDQFKH¶VRFFDVLRQDOLVPWKDWVRXJK WRFKDOOHQJH'HVFDUWHV¶PLQG-body dualism, that is 
to say, the idea that some transcendental power is the cause of physical and mental events as 
well as interactions between body and mind. For Romantic thinkers, according to Schmitt, it 
is not the person himself who acts but rather a super-human force ± God or some secularised 
alternative such as a vitalist force ± WKDW PRYHV KXPDQ EHLQJV DV PHUH µRFFDVLRQV¶ LQ DQ
otherwise predetermined system ± hence notions of fixed fate rather than open-ended destiny. 
According to Schmitt, the world becomes at the hands of the Romantics little else than 
contingent material for the actions of the ultimate divine reality. 
 
With the secularisation of European thought proceeding apace, the crisis of metaphysical 
theism in the eighteenth century heralded the rise of post-theistic ontology as developed by 
Comte. In this context, Schmitt accuses Romanticism of accommodating two rival 
conceptions: either the idea of humanity and a µUHYROXWLRQDU\ JRG¶ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH
people, the general will, the public or collectivist society), or else the notion of impersonal 
order and a µFRQVHUYDWLYHJRG¶FRQFHLYHGDVthe source of civilisations, cultures, traditions or 
nations). The genius of the Romantics was to root both these conceptions in the subjective 
imagination of the human person and to elevate the isolated individual into the ultimate 
arbiter of what is real and true. As a secularised and subjectified variant of occasionalism, 
Romanticism views realit\LQSXUHO\DUELWUDU\WHUPVDV³nothing more than an occasion for the 
free play of the individual imagination´.25 
 
Thus, Schmitt rejects political Romanticism on three closely connected grounds. First of all, 
ontological aestheticism ± the twin claim that subjective emotion determines reality and that 
the real is what occasions emotional experience. Second, irony and revolution in the sense 
that the Romantics are accused by Schmitt of denying the primacy of actuality and replacing 
it with the priority of unlimited possibility. This for Schmitt is evinced by the Romantic focus 
on the remote, the exotic, the alien and the erotic. Rival possibilities neutralise each other and 
therefore undercut political decision, ZKLFKLVWKHJUHDWHVWDIIURQWWR6FKPLWW¶VRZQSUHIHUHQFH
for decisionism. Third ± and closely connected with this point ± the poeticisation of the world, 
and the destruction of both moral judgment and political action. 
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As already argued, Schmitt does not so much posit a Romantic flight from the world as a 
collusive complicity with the prevailing power of the hegemonic order ± liberalism ± whereas 
Berlin equates Romanticism with the dominant counter-Enlightenment movement that 
brought about nationalism and atavistic ethnocentrism. Either way, the Romantic movement 
is seen at best as a departure from the primary Western tradition that grew out of Greco-
Roman philosophy and at worst as a betrayal of the foundations of Western civilisation of 
rational discourse. 
 
However, Berlin¶V and Schmitt¶V caricature ignores Romanticism¶V defence of metaphysical 
and political realism against both idealism and materialism and thus against the extreme 
liberal fusion of both. Indeed, liberalism combines abstract ideals such as negative liberty and 
absolute equality with the materialist forces of state and market power in a manner that 
sunders concrete things from their symbolic significance, starting with labour but extending to 
the whole of society, nature and life itself ± based an impoverished understanding of reason 
that is reduced to little more than instrumental rationality. By contrast, the Romantic tradition 
seeks to reconnect matter with meaning by developing a more holistic conception of reason 
that is integrated with feeling, habit, passion and the imagination. Art is vital precisely 
because it has the power to link knowledge to action by fusing reason with sensibility, uniting 
our natural sense of beauty and goodness and our duty to act accordingly. Building on the 
works of J.G. Hamann, F.D. Jacobi and Justus Möser, the early German Romantics ± Novalis, 
Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher ± highlighted the emptiness of 
modern reason, a negative force is capable of destroying all custom and tradition while 
lacking the power to create anything positive.26 1RYDOLV¶QRWLRQRIHeimweh (homesickness) 
captures the modern condition of rootlessness and a lack of loyalty that run counter to our 
desire for belonging ± belonging to communities, which reason views as reactionary and 
oppressive, and belonging to nature, which reason strips of all beauty, magic and mystery. 
 
By emphasising the creative power of the imagination, Romanticism recovered and renewed a 
much richer conception of reason while avoiding the fate of both rationalism and 
revolutionism. One example is the QRWLRQRIµUHYHUHQFH¶LQWKHZULWLQJVRI*RHWKHLWGHVFULEHV
the paradoxical coincidence of passive reception and active agency involved in contemplation 
and an openness to transcendent beauty that shines forth through the ordering of the universe. 
In this manner, reverence is more rationalist because it reconnects reason to its cosmic 
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outlook and it is also more empiricist than what Goethe described as 1HZWRQLDQ VFLHQFH¶V
³gloomy empirical-mechanical-dogmatic torture cKDPEHU´ because the latter locks philosophy 
and theology into an iron cage of abstract, general categories.27 
 
And instead of focusing on a vague irrational feeling of the whole, Romanticism shifts the 
emphasis away from the formal laws and naked self-interest that dominate modern 
contractualism towards the embodied and the particular in an attempt to perceive the 
imperceptible and feel the impalpable.28 By contrast with the Gnostic claim of pre-existing 
matter, the early German Romantics sought to restore and extend the Christian Neo-Platonist 
tradition of theological poesis. As Michael Martin writes, 
he [Novalis] sees the world of the senses in participation with the divine reality 
undergirding it, a reality he attempts to disclose in his poetry. This participation 
rises to awareness only in the act of imagination, but it is not, therefore, only an 






Early English Romantics like Blake, Shelley and Coleridge, with their German 
contemporaries Novalis, Hölderlin and Friedrich Schlegel, or their French counterparts 
Joseph Joubert, Chateaubriand, Maine de Biran and the young Victor Hugo ± for all their 
diverse and periodic modes of political radicalism ± actually refused impersonal pantheism 
(or panentheism, as in Spinoza) just as much as they refused the worship of monstrous 
wilfulness (as in the voluntarism of Hobbes and Locke). Instead, they combined a 
commitment to radical reform with a deep respect for tradition and the legacy of the patristic 
and medieval Church. Their sympathy for Catholicism was not a reactionary response to the 
7HUURURIWKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQEXWUDWKHUDUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH5HIRUPDWLRQ¶VGisenchanting 
RIWUDQVFHQGHQFHDV1RYDOLVSXWLW³WKHZRUOGly had now won the upper hand, and the feeling 
IRU DUW VXIIHUHG LQ V\PSDWK\ ZLWK UHOLJLRQ´ 30  And instead of uncritically defending 
Christendom, they argued for a re-enchanted transcendence and a reimagined Christianity that 
³PXVW DJDLQ EHFRPH DOLYH DQG DFWLYH DQG again form a visible church without regard to 
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national boundaries. Once again it must receive into its bosom all hungry souls and become 
the mediator of the old and the new world´.31 Since pantheism for Novalis is the idea that 
everything can be the mediating organ of the divine, it is fully compatible with the 
monotheistic idea that mediation requires a single, central mediator ± God become man ±  
which is wholly absent from the panentheism of Spinoza.32 In the words of Schlegel, the 
Romantics ³OLIWHG WKHYHLORI ,VLV´ to reveal once moUH LQ%ODNH¶VZRUGV WKH³FRXQWHQDQFH
GLYLQH´ZKLFKLQWKHGD\OLJKW³doth a human form display´. In this manner, a re-enchanted 
transcendence was no simple restoration or Counter-Reformation. Rather, it marked an 
attempt to recover the archaic western wisdom in a more culturally dispersed, imaginatively 
mediated and feeling-imbued idiom that could unite catholic orthodox doctrine with popular 
practice. 
 
Thus, Schmitt, like Berlin, was wrong to think that German political Romanticism itself 
halted at mere political irony ± any more than it halted at mere epistemological irony. It rather 
advocated, beyond the Lutheran-inspired liberal enclosing of religion within the boundaries of 
the state, more subsidiarist and organic mediating social structures linked to the idea that the 
Church surpassed in its social purposes the central coercive control of the Leviathan. In this 
way mere irony was transcended in the name of an obscure glimpse of cosmic unity ± 
6FKOHLHUPDFKHU¶V µLQWXLWLRQ RI WKH XQLYHUVH¶ Thereby the liberal oscillation between the 
individual and the collective is by no means necessary or normative but can be mediated by a 
complex web of interpersonal relations without however destroying the creative tension 
between the person and society. 
 
5. The Romantic Alternative to Liberal Pessimism 
 
The early Romantics were among the first to recognise the true nature of liberalism. Whereas 
enlightened absolutism failed to guarantee individual liberty and provide popular participation 
in government, the liberal tradition elevated the pursuit of happiness over and above the quest 
for belonging to a political community. Despite these differences, both absolutism and 
liberalism were united in abolishing the mediating institutions between the citizen and the 
state, bringing guilds, councils and corporation under direct central control and leaving 
society atomised and individuals in a state of anomie ± stripped of any real possibility for 
local self-government and personal affiliation to intermediary groups that are democratically 
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self-governing. In order to marry personal freedom with a sense of communal belonging, the 
Romantics recovered and renewed the ancient notion that we are political animals and the 
Christian conception that we are social beings ± rather than the a-social isolated individuals so 
beloved of liberals. Key to the anthropology of early Romanticism is the twin idea that the 
relational microcosm of family and community mirrors the ordering of the universe and that 
the vocation of each person (their place and role in the polity) is more primary than natural 
individual ULJKWVRUWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDFW³PDQVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVKXPDQVRFLHW\RUDVWKH
UHODWLRQ RI PDQ WR PDQ >« DQG@ WKH YRFDWLRQ RI PDQ LV DFKLHYHG only in society and the 
community of everyone´.33 
 
The early Romantics refuted the liberal idea of enlightened self-interest as the best basis to 
mitigate the Fall and original sin. On the contrary, self-interest legitimates people to disregard 
the social contract and thereby licenses the state to arrogate to itself exceptional powers of 
coercion that reduce citizens to bare individuals, provoking unrest and revolutionary violence: 
³raw self-interest seems to be immeasurable, anti-systematic. It has not allowed itself to be 
OLPLWHG DW DOO >«@ WLV IRUPDO DFFHSWDQFH RI common egoism as a principle has done untold 
damage. The germ of the revolution of our day rests nowhere but here´.34  The genuine 
alternative is not an absolute monarchy that similarly subordinates the person to the sovereign 
but instead a polity that views love as more primary than either egotism or abstract altruism ± 
the giving, receiving and returning of affection and loyalty. Far from idealising love, 
Romanticism emphasised the impurity of love: aV6FKOHJHOSXWLW³SULPDOORYHDSSHDUVQHYHU
pure but in various shapes and guises: as trust, humility, devotion, serenity, loyalty, shame 
DQGJUDWLWXGHEXWPRVWO\DV ORQJLQJDQGTXLHWPHODQFKRO\´ Contra the moralism of law in 
the liberal tradition, the ethics of love is for the early Romantics the original bond of social 
life that binds human beings to one another and to nature: ³ZKRHYHUGRHVQRWNQRZQDWXUH
through love will never know KHU´35  
 
Crucially, art is vital for the Romantic alternative to both liberalism and enlightened 
DEVROXWLVP%H\RQGHYHQ$ULVWRWOH¶VQRWLRQRIzoon politikon DQG$QTXLQDV¶ LGHDRIanimal 
sociale, the early Romantics developed the notion of man as an artist. In an apparent inversion 
of Plato (who in reality saw the philosopher-king as an earthly Creator trying to perfect the ordering 
within the republic), Novalis and Schlegel develop the idea that art is not the privilege of the 
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DULVWRFUDWLF µIHZ¶ EXW WKDW WKH µPDQ\¶ are just as creative if they are treated as artists by the 
PRQDUFKLFµRQH¶,QGHHGthe ideal ruler is a supreme artist who enables his subjects to fulfil their 
own unique creative vocation: according to Novalis, ³DWUXHSULQFHLVWKHDUWLVWRIDUWLVWV, that is, the 
director of artists. Every person should be an artist. Everything can become a fine art´.36 Schlegel 
takes this further by arguing that a properly Romanticised Christian vision democratises artistic 
direction:  
No artist should be by himself alone the artist of artists, the central artist, the director of all 
others; but all should be it, each from their own standpoint. None should be merely a 
representative of his kind, but should relate himself and his kind to the whole, which he 
should direct and rule. Like the Roman senators, true artists are a nation of kings.37 
 
(FKRLQJ 9LFR¶V WULDG verum-factum-bonum (which constitutes a human participation in the 
Trinitarian generation of the Divine Word ± DWRQFHµWUXH¶DQGµPDGH¶± and the processive donation 
of the Holy Spirit as eminent goodness), Schlegel also argued we cannot access the truth directly in 
the book of nature or literally in thHERRNRIVFULSWXUH5DWKHUZHFDQDSSUHKHQGWKHWUDFHVRI*RG¶V
creative activity everywhere as long as we broaden our reason to include the feeling for nature and 
religious faith beyond mere mythology. We perfect our God-given nature precisely by mediating 
the divine in all that is ± revealing the beauty and goodness of the universe and human society 
through the exercise of virtue, defined as ³UHDVRQIRUPHGLQWRHQHUJ\´DQGDV³JHQLDOLW\´38 In the 
ZULWLQJV RI WKH 5RPDQWLFV YLUWXH FHDVHV WR EH 0DFKLDYHOOL¶V PLOLWDU\ SURZHVV RU WKH D-political 
moral virtue of Rousseau and Smith and instead becomes the principle by which we translate the 
ethics of love into practice. Work as art is central to a genuinely Romantic politics: as the English 
Christian socialist William Morris argued, ³the aim of art [is] to destroy the curse of labour by 
making work the pleasurable satisfaction of our impulse towards energy, and giving to that 
energy hope of producing something worth its exercise´39 
 
For this reason, the vision of the Romantics is indeed an aesthetic politics, though not the 
caricature painted by Schmitt and Berlin. Against the µmachine state¶ of both enlightened 
absolutism and liberalism, early Romanticism proposed DQ µRUJDQLF VWDWH¶ WKDW IXVHV
individuality with community, liberty with communal belonging and tradition with innovation 
by dispersing sovereign power among all the persons which constitute society ± including the 
corporate bodies of guilds, corporations and councils. These and other intermediary 
institutions can combine self-government and popular participation with a sense of shared 
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purpose and leadership based on excellence and ethos. Such a plural polity outflanks in advance 
the shared liberal and absolutist extremes of simultaneously collectivising the people and atomising 
society. By avoiding any abstract utopia imposed by absolutist fiat or a revolutionary vanguard, the 
µRUJDQLFVWDWH¶RIWKH5RPDQWLFVSURWHFWVWUDGLWLRQDQGFRQWLQXLW\ZKLOHDOVRSURPRWLQJLQQRYDWLRQ
and change WKDW UHIOHFWV SHRSOH¶V QHHGV DQG LQWHUHVWV Key to the aesthetic politics of early 
Romanticism is the Christian fusion of the classical virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and 
courage with the theological virtues of faith, hope and love. Of these, as St Paul reminds us, love is 
the greatest. And the Romantics would add labour: as Morris put it, ³/RYHDQGZRUNWKHVHWZR
WKLQJV RQO\´. By practising virtue, we can redeem the promise of an original harmony that 
was distorted but never fully destroyed by the Fall. Against liberal pessimism, the early 
Romantics gave us an ethical rather than an economistic vision, which suggests that original 
sin was only ever ultimately provisional. 
